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Abstract 
Agricultural research has transformed agriculture and in doing so 
contributed to the transformation of economies. Economic issues 
arise because agricultural research is subject to various market fail­
ures, because the resulting innovations and technological changes 
have important economic consequences for net income and its distri­
bution, and because the consequences are difficult to discern and 
attribute. Economists have developed models and measures of the 
economic consequences of agricultural R&D and related policies in 
contributions that relate to a very broad literature ranging across 
production economics, development economics, industrial organiza­
tion, economic history, welfare economics, political economy, econo­
metrics, and so on. A key general finding is that the social rate of 
return to investments in agricultural R&D has been generally high. 
Specific findings differ depending on methods and modeling assump­
tions, particularly assumptions concerning the research lag distribu­
tion, the nature of the research-induced technological change, and 
the nature of the markets for the affected commodities. 
  1. INTRODUCTION 
Agricultural research has transformed agriculture and in doing so has contributed to the 
transformation of whole economies. Economic and policy issues arise because agricultural 
research is subject to various market failures, because the resulting innovations and tech­
nological changes have important economic consequences for net income and its distribu­
tion among individuals and among factors of production, and because the consequences 
are difficult to discern. These issues have been studied by economists and documented in a 
literature on the economics of agricultural research and development (R&D) that began 
as such in the 1950s, with work by T.W. Schultz and others. 
Over the ensuing half century or so, economists have developed models and measures of 
the economic consequences of agricultural R&D and related policies in contributions that relate 
to a very broad literature, drawing on and at times contributing to the full range of subfields of 
economics.1 For instance, some contributions extend back to the foundations of production 
economics, the measures of inputs and outputs, and their relationships to one another, as 
we attempt to obtain better measures of productivity. Others relate to the modern litera­
ture on industrial organization as we attempt to understand the role of market power of 
firms with intellectual property rights to inventions. Yet others relate to income distribu­
tion in multimarket settings, whether in the context of rich-country agriculture and con­
cerns for displaced labor or in developing countries where a general equilibrium approach 
is necessitated by the role of agriculture in the economy as a whole. At some level, then, to 
understand the economic literature on agricultural R&D requires an appreciation of its 
relationship to the major subfields of economics (such as econometrics, labor economics, 
public economics, production economics, economic history, industrial organization, or 
operations research) to which it contributes and from which it draws ideas, methodologi­
cal approaches, and tools and techniques. Within the constraints of this review, however, 
for the most part we treat the literature on the economics of agricultural R&D in 
isolation, only occasionally drawing attention to the linkages to the broader literature. 
In this review, we focus on the role of methods used by economists and their implica­
tions for findings about research impacts. We cover the mainstream issues and the bulk of 
the published work on the economics of agricultural R&D, dealing with conceptual models 
of the impacts of agricultural research, data and methods for measuring the impacts, the 
resulting measures of the impacts, and the meaning of those measures. 
Section 2 is organized around supply and demand models of the size and distribution of 
research impacts among producers, consumers, and others in the marketing chain. Much 
of the literature in this area has concerned the role of modeling assumptions in determin­
ing the findings—in particular, assumptions about the nature of research-induced techno­
logical changes and how they are represented in the model, as well as assumptions about 
the form of competition, and related issues. We present the main ideas from that literature 
and attempt a synthesis. 
An important and often underappreciated type of economic research is contributed 
by studies that describe research institutions and quantify research investments or by 
1Griliches (2001) observed that, “Current work 
(Griliches(R&D) expenditures development 
1944), the first detailed total-factor productivity (TFP) calculations (Barton & Cooper 1948), the first estimates of 
has deep roots in the early work of agricultural economics. The first micro-production function estimates (Tintner 
on the role of public and private research in productivity growth 
returns to public research and 1958, Schultz 1953), and the first 
production function estimates with an added R&D variable (Griliches 1964) all originated in agricultural econom­
ics” (p. 23). 
       
   
  
 
 
studies that develop measures of agricultural outputs, inputs, and productivity, and there­
by provide data for econometric and other modeling studies. Section 3 documents some 
key contributions of this type and touches on some enduring issues related to the data. 
Section 4 discusses a different set of methodological questions that arise in modeling 
agricultural innovation. In particular, the treatment of (spatial) spillovers and research lag 
structures can be seen both as elements of the general attribution problem raised by 
Alston & Pardey (2001) and as sources of specification bias with implications for the 
interpretation of findings. A related literature linking innovation processes to technology 
development and economic impacts deals with the rate, extent, and nature of technology 
adoption and diffusion processes. 
Section 5 reports key findings about the impacts of agricultural research in terms of its 
consequences for the rate of technological change (or productivity growth) and its factor 
bias as well as the rate of return to the investments. The rate of return evidence generally 
indicates that agricultural research has generated very large dividends. It supports the view 
that agriculture is characterized by market failures associated with incomplete property 
rights over inventions and that, in spite of the significant government intervention to 
correct the market failure, nations have continued to underinvest in agricultural research. 
Section 6 summarizes and concludes the review. 
2. MODELS OF THE SIZE AND DISTRIBUTION 
OF RESEARCH BENEFITS 
Agricultural economists have used supply and demand models of commodity markets to 
represent agricultural research impacts, beginning with Schultz (1953) and Griliches 
(1958), with important subsequent contributions by Petersen (1967), Duncan & Tisdell 
(1971), Duncan (1972), Akino & Hayami (1975), and Scobie (1976), among others.2,3 
In a standard model of research benefits, research causes the commodity supply curve 
to shift down and out against a stationary demand curve, giving rise to an increase in 
quantity produced and consumed as well as a lower price. The benefits are assessed using 
Marshallian measures of research-induced changes in consumer surplus for consumer 
benefits and of research-induced changes in producer surplus for producer benefits. 
The total gross annual research benefits (GARB) depend primarily on the size of the 
research-induced supply shift (expressed as a vertical shift by an amount equal to a propor­
tion, k, of the initial price) and the scale of the industry to which it applies. Hence, Griliches 
(1958) proposed the approximation GARB = kPQ, where P is the commodity price and 
Q is the annual quantity to which the supply shift applies.4 Some issues in the literature 
relate to the methods used for measuring the primary determinant of total measured 
benefits—the research-induced reduction in the industry-wide unit cost of production as 
represented by the supply shift, k—for instance, those based on adoption rates combined 
2Although this seems to be a natural approach for technologies embodied in particular inputs, like seeds, it is less 
well-suited to many other kinds of agricultural R&D. An alternative approach may be to use a model of supply and 
demand for agricultural science. 
3Some studies leave this model implicit when inferring a rate of return to research from the parameters of an 
econometric model of production (e.g., Evenson 1967) or when using short-cut approximations to measure benefits 
(e.g., Griliches 1958). 
4As noted by Alston et al. (1995, pp. 60–61), and more recently elaborated by Oehmke & Crawford (2002), the 
elasticity of supply can have important implications for measures of research benefits if it is used to translate an 
assumed horizontal shift into a vertical shift, or vice versa. 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
with changes in experimental yields or commercial yields or others based on changes in 
total factor productivity. Other important issues are the size and structure of the market to 
which the shift factor pertains as well as the time-varying magnitude of the shift. 
The distribution of the benefits between producers and consumers depends on the 
relative elasticities of supply and demand, the nature of the research-induced supply shift, 
and, less importantly, on the functional forms of supply and demand (see Alston et al. 
1995). The nature of the research-induced supply shift has been controversial because it 
matters for results and is not easy to observe. Lindner & Jarrett (1978, 1980), Rose 
(1980), and Wise & Fell (1980) discussed the underlying conditions for and likelihood of 
parallel, pivotal, convergent, and divergent supply shifts driven by research. They also 
considered the implications of the alternatives for the size and distribution of total re­
search benefits (see also Voon & Edwards 1991, Oehmke & Crawford 2002, among 
others). One point demonstrated by this literature was that the assumption of a linear 
supply function that is inelastic in the neighborhood of the equilibrium implies a positive 
intercept on the quantity axis, which is both implausible and a source of awkwardness 
when measuring the benefits from research-induced supply shifts that require extrapolat­
ing supply back to the origin. A similar problem arises with constant elasticity supply 
models (the main alternative to the linear model in this literature), which also become 
implausible at low prices and quantities. 
One solution to this set of problems is to assume an alternative functional form for the 
supply function, as illustrated in Figure 1, where D0 represents the demand for U.S. 
agricultural output and S0 represents the supply.
5 Suppose a research-induced technical 
change causes supply to shift down in parallel to S1 and, as a result, quantity produced 
and consumed increases from Q0 to Q1 and price falls from P0 to P1. Accepting Harberger’s 
(1971) postulates so that changes in economic surplus are the relevant welfare measures, 
the total benefits from the research-induced supply shift are equal to the area between the 
two supply curves, behind the demand curve, and this is equal to area (B + C + E + F + G).  
Of that total, the consumer benefit is equal to area (A + B + F) and the producer benefit is 
equal to area (C + G) given the assumption of a vertically parallel supply shift, which 
means area A is equal to area E. These shares of the total benefits are distributed according 
to the elasticities of supply (e) and demand (Z, representing the absolute value), where the 
producer share is approximately Z/(Z + e) and the consumer share is approximately e/(Z + 
e). Alternatively, suppose research causes a pivotal supply shift (i.e., holding the price 
intercept constant at b) that would have the same price and quantity effects. The total 
research benefits are now only roughly one-half of those from a parallel shift, but 
the consumer benefits are the same as from the corresponding parallel shift such that the 
producer benefits must be smaller, possibly negative. 
To illustrate the role of elasticities in conjunction with the nature of the supply shift in 
determining the size and distribution of research benefits we use an algebraic representa­
tion of the model depicted in Figure 1, as follows: 
P ¼ ð1 k1Þbþ ð1 k2ÞBQb ðsupplyÞ; ð1Þ
5This supply function nests linear and constant elasticity models as special cases and has the virtue of a positive price 
intercept (or shutdown price) while permitting supply to be inelastic in the vicinity of the equilibrium (see Lynam & 
Jones 1984, Pachico et al. 1987, Alston & Wohlgenant 1989). 
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Figure 1 
Price, quantity, and welfare effects of agricultural R&D. 
Q ¼ APZ ðdemandÞ: ð2Þ
This model nests as special cases both the linear supply model (b = 1) and the constant 
elasticity supply model (b = 0) and can combine these functional form alternatives with 
alternative types of supply shifts by using alternative combinations of values for k1 (which 
implies parallel shifts in the price direction) and k2 (which implies multiplicative shifts in 
the quantity direction); B and A are “slope” parameters. Although it cannot be solved 
analytically in its general form for the equilibrium price and quantity, this model can be 
solved numerically given particular values of parameters. Table 1 shows the resulting 
estimates of producer benefits as a share of total benefits for three different kinds 
of 1% shifts down of the supply function: (a) vertically “parallel” (k1 = 0.01, k2 = 0); 
(b) “pivotal” (or multiplicative in the quantity direction, k1 = 0,  k2 = 0.01); and (c) 
“proportional” (or multiplicative in the price direction, k1 = k2 = 0.01)—essentially 
combining a parallel shift and a pivotal shift. This range of parameters, which implies 
values for the elasticity of supply at the initial equilibrium ranging from 0.33 to 2.0, is 
combined with demand elasticities from 0.5 to 1. 6 
6Small elasticities of demand are appropriate for most agricultural commodities in the context of a closed economy 
or they would small countries in trade (facing excess demand elasticities for domestic output approaching infinity) 
model. But larger elasticities are appropriate for traded (or tradable) goods, and in many cases, either countries are 
be but for trade barriers. More elaborate models are required to partition the “consumer surplus” in Figure 1 among 
nations and to deal with the consequences of trade-distorting policies in such cases. 
          
 
       
  
 
      
       
   
 
  
 
  
   
 
  
 
  
   
 
  
 
  
  
 
Table 1 Producer shares (percentage) of research benefits and their determinantsa 
Supply function parameters Demand elasticity (absolute value) 
b b
Elasticity 
(«) 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 4.0 
Parameter values Producer shares of benefits (percent) 
Pivotal supply shift: k1 = 0.00, k2 = 0.01 
4.00 0.25 0.33 100 25 9 29 62 
4.00 0.50 0.50 150 67 25 0 44 
4.00 0.75 1.00 234 150 100 67 0 
2.00 0.25 0.67 71 20 8 25 57 
2.00 0.50 1.00 100 50 20 0 40 
2.00 0.75 2.00 140 100 72 50 0 
Proportional supply shift: k1 = 0.01, k2 = 0.01 
4.00 0.25 0.33 0 37 55 64 81 
4.00 0.50 0.50 17 44 58 67 82 
4.00 0.75 1.00 17 38 50 59 75 
2.00 0.25 0.67 14 20 38 50 71 
2.00 0.50 1.00 0 25 40 50 70 
2.00 0.75 2.00 4 20 32 40 60 
Parallel supply shift: k1 = 0.01, k2 = 0.00 
4.00 0.25 0.33 60 75 82 86 92 
4.00 0.50 0.50 50 67 75 80 89 
4.00 0.75 1.00 34 50 60 67 80 
2.00 0.25 0.67 43 60 69 75 86 
2.00 0.50 1.00 33 50 60 67 80 
2.00 0.75 2.00 20 34 43 50 67 
aEntries in this table are measures of producer benefits as a percentage of the total benefits from the supply shift. 
The parameter b represents the shutdown price as a fraction of the initial price, and the parameter b is the exponent 
of the quantity in the price-dependent supply response function, such that a larger value of b tends to imply a 
smaller supply elasticity, as does a smaller value of b. 
With a linear model, producers lose from a pivotal shift either if demand is inelastic 
model. Producers do not benefit from 
Somewhat similar results if demand is elastic but less elastic than supply. 
or 
are found here 
for the nonlinear a pivotal shift unless demand is 
elastic, and much more elastic than supply. In contrast, with a parallel research-induced 
      
supply shift, producers gain a substantial share of the benefits, especially if supply is 
relatively inelastic. And, with the proportional shift, although the producer share of 
benefits is smaller than for the parallel shift, it is still in the range of 30–60% of total 
benefits given the more likely values for the supply and demand elasticities. 
The possibility of losses to producers in aggregate is often discounted, on the grounds 
either that demand is relatively elastic or that a parallel research-induced supply shift is 
relatively likely (or that the pivotal shift seems comparatively unlikely), but concrete 
empirical evidence on that issue has been elusive to date. Thus, even when we can be 
assured of benefits to the nation, some uncertainty remains about the distribution of 
benefits between producers and consumers.7 
2.1. Distribution of Benefits Among Producers 
Another issue is distribution of producer benefits among producers. Even if we can be 
assured that producers as a whole would benefit, those who do not adopt the new 
technology will not gain and may even be made worse off (if the adoption by others leads 
to price reductions), so individual producers or groups of producers may be uncertain 
about their benefits from a given research investment because of uncertainty over what 
technology may be developed and who will adopt it and when. Timing issues are also 
important. The lags between investing in agricultural research and reaping benefits are 
very long—recent results from Alston et al. (2009), reinforced with evidence presented 
by Alston et al. (2008), suggest lags as long as 10–15 years before important benefits begin 
to be realized, with streams of benefits extending for 40 years and more after the initial 
investment. This means that the distributional question has an intergenerational dimen­
sion to add to the other dimensions related to factor ownership and adoption patterns. 
In addition to issues about the distribution of benefits and costs between adopters and 
nonadopters, there may be further distributional issues associated with how the “producer 
surplus” is distributed among factor suppliers: Do land owners benefit at the expense of 
suppliers of farm labor, including farm operators, or vice versa? To illustrate the key ideas, 
we can divide the total surplus into benefits accruing to “farmers” (i.e., the suppliers of 
land and managerial inputs used in agricultural production) and “others” (i.e., the suppli­
ers of other inputs, including off-farm labor, purchased by farmers and other agribusiness 
inputs used in activities beyond the farm gate). Following Alston et al. (1995, pp. 246–50), 
we can measure these outcomes using a variant of the Muth (1964) two-factor, single-
commodity market in which research gives rise to factor-augmenting changes in technolo­
gy, which imply shifts in factor demand and product supply. Here, producer benefits 
correspond to producer surplus measured off the supply function for the factor supplied 
by farmers, and under the maintained assumption of competition, national benefits are 
given by the sum of changes in producer surplus across factor suppliers plus consumer 
surplus in the output market. 
7All of this discussion abstracts from the dynamics of supply response to price, which means that the elasticity of 
supply (and, in some cases, the elasticity of demand) becomes greater with increases in the length of run. The 
dynamics of supply response to price—either alone or in combination with the spatial dynamics of the research-
innovation-adoption process—mean that the pattern of research benefits evolves over time in complex ways that 
vary from case to case. A consideration of these dynamic aspects adds to the ambiguity of results derived from 
relatively simple comparative static analysis. 
In this setting, it is not necessary to extrapolate any of the functions back to the origin to 
measure the changes in welfare associated with technical changes specified in this way. 
Local approximations to the functions are adequate for measuring the impacts of the small 
displacements involved. By measuring producer welfare impacts in the factor markets, we 
avoid the problem of having to specify the nature of the research-induced shift in the 
commodity supply function. Even so, we cannot avoid the fact that the measure of research 
benefits will depend on the assumed nature of the research-induced technical changes, 
which, with other assumptions, will implicitly define the nature of the shift of the commod­
ity supply function. A difference is that we may have a reasonable intuitive basis for 
assuming a particular type of technological change (e.g., factor augmenting, neutral, or 
biased) in situations where we do not have such a basis for assuming a particular form 
of research-induced product supply shift. 
In fact, however, the very specification of technology defined at the industry level or the 
use of a representative firm model will condition distributional findings: The approach 
generally entails technological changes that are consistent with multiplicative shifts of 
supply functions and the associated implications for distribution of benefits. For instance, 
if simple models such as the Cobb-Douglas model or the Constant Elasticity of Substitu­
tion model are used to represent the production function, factor-augmenting technological 
change (whether neutral across all factors or biased to augment just one factor) or the 
inclusion of research as a separate input will imply proportional (pivotal or otherwise 
divergent) supply curve shifts. More flexible functional forms for the production function 
may imply different types of technological possibilities, but such functions may prove 
difficult to work with. The same issues arise if, rather than a production function, we 
begin by specifying a cost or profit function, and we derive the implied output supply 
functions. Martin & Alston (1997) exemplify this approach to discussing the effects of 
R&D on market outcomes. Here, as they showed, parallel shifts can be derived but only if 
technological change enters the profit or cost function as a separate input. If the R&D is 
factor augmenting, or has the effect of reducing the cost for “effective” inputs, however, 
a multiplicative supply shift is implied. 
If an industry is made up of diverse individual firms, it may not be well represented 
by an approach that implicitly or explicitly assumes an industry technology or a repre­
sentative firm. Wohlgenant (1997) illustrated the roles of entry and exit of firms, variety 
in cost conditions among firms, and differential rates of adoption in determining the 
nature of the shift of the industry supply function (see also Foster & Rausser 1993). 
Consider an industry made up of heterogeneous firms in which firm entry and exit are 
key components of adjustment along the industry supply curve in response to price 
changes. A rising industry supply curve may reflect progressive increments in firms’ 
reservation prices for entry, indicating variations in their opportunity costs of the 
quasi-fixed factors earning quasi-rents that make up producer surplus. A factor-aug­
menting technical change could give rise to proportional shifts in individual firm supply 
functions (in the context of the types of production, cost, or profit functions discussed 
above), while leaving their reservation 
shift, such that marginal and average approximately parallel industry supply 
pricesin reservation reductions 
proportionalapproximatelybemay 
prices unaffected, and the resulting shift in the 
industry supply function or pivotal as well. In 
contrast, similar per-unit across firms would imply an 
curve costs 
would fall by the same amount per unit. More generally, technical changes may involve 
combinations of effects on the slopes and intercepts of individual firm supply functions 
  
 
      
 
 
as well as differential effects on different types of firms. Thus, research-induced techno­
logical change may plausibly give rise to supply curve shifts that are divergent, conver­
gent, or parallel—depending on the nature of the industry, its technology, and the 
technological change—in ways that make the issue difficult to judge either ex ante or 
ex post. Because specification choices are unavoidable, it makes sense to be aware of the 
implications of the main alternative specifications for findings about the distribution of 
research benefits. 
2.2. Extensions to the Basic Model 
Measures of the size and distribution of research benefits will be affected by various 
complications that can be introduced to extend the basic model represented in Figure 1. 
The introduction of international trade is a straightforward elaboration of the simple 
model, from which we can obtain measures of welfare impacts for different spatial or 
market aggregates.8 It becomes slightly more complicated when we allow for technologi­
cal spillovers in the same model. More elaborate and complex multimarket models are 
implied if we want to disaggregate the market structure either (a) vertically in order to 
represent different stages of the marketing chain or (b) horizontally in order to represent 
different geopolitical or spatial markets for a given product or different products (includ­
ing different qualities of the same product). Alston et al. (1995) laid out the basic theory 
for these approaches, and a number of studies have reported specific applications (among 
the many examples are Mullen et al. 1989, Freebairn 1992, Frisvold 1997, Wohlgenant 
1997, Davis & Espinoza 1998, and Zhao et al. 2000). 
A further dimension for extension to the basic model is to allow for the case of 
proprietary technology. The basic model treats the technological change as essentially 
exogenous, a reasonable treatment for the case of public research from which the results 
are freely accessible, which is the stereotypical application. However, this model is not 
appropriate for proprietary technology resulting from private research over which the 
inventor has (often monopoly) property rights, such as the fruits of modern biotechnology. 
In an important contribution, Moschini & Lapan (1997) extended the basic model to deal 
with proprietary research that could lead to a drastic innovation or a nondrastic innova­
tion that would be priced in either case so as to entirely eliminate the pre-existing technol­
ogy. A number of subsequent studies have extended the ideas, but these types of 
conceptual developments have not been incorporated much in the applied work to date, 
and very little evidence is available on the distribution of benefits from private research 
between technology developers and providers, on the one hand, and others including 
farmers, consumers, and agribusiness.9 
8A significant complication in evaluating the supply-shifting consequences of agricultural research is that, because of 
the biological basis of agricultural production, many agricultural technologies have distinctive location-specific 
attributes. The specific location of firms may well affect their decisions about adoption of technology and the 
resulting factor demand and output supply responses to R&D, with implications for the aggregate industry-wide 
responses, even within a given spatial or market aggregate. Substantive efforts are under way to calibrate measured 
supply shifts in ways that take explicit account of these spatial heterogeneities (for example, see http://www. 
HarvestChoice.org). 
9Moschini & Lapan (1997) treated the research effort and the research result as exogenous, whereas Alston & 
Venner (2002) developed a model in which the research effort was chosen by the biotech firm. See also Frisvold et al. 
(1999), Falck-Zepeda et al. (2000), Qaim (2003), and Lapan & Moschini (2004). 
   
 
    
  
The basic model also assumes competition in the market for the commodity and the 
absence of any other market distortions. Models of research benefits have been extended 
to incorporate various types of market distortions, for example, (a) those resulting from 
the introduction of distortions associated with government policies such as farm commod­
ity programs or trade barriers, including the failure to impose optimal trade taxes in 
the large-country case; (b) those resulting from the exercise of market power by middle­
men (e.g., Huang & Sexton 1998); and (c) those resulting from environmental external­
ities (e.g., Antle & Pingali 1994). In this context, the main effect of a market distortion is 
to change the distribution of research benefits, with comparatively small effects on the 
total benefits. These changes in the distribution of benefits (and the total benefits) depend 
on the nature of the market distortion, along with the other market characteristics and the 
nature of the research-induced technological change, which together determine the poten­
tial research benefits in an undistorted setting. 
Alston et al. (1988) identified and Alston & Martin (1995) subsequently proved a key 
aspect of the relationship between the distorted and undistorted research benefits. Specifi­
cally, research benefits in the presence of a distortion (DWACT) are equal to benefits in the 
absence of the distortion (DWMAX) minus the effects of research on the deadweight losses 
WACT WMAXfrom the distortion (DDWL, where we define DWL = – )—i.e., DWACT =
DWMAX – DDWL. Thus, research benefits may be smaller or greater than in the absence of 
the distortion, depending on whether the research-induced technological change exacer­
bates or mitigates, respectively, the deadweight loss from the distortion—a result that 
depends, in turn, on the specific nature of a distortion and the other features of the market 
in which it applies. This simple but powerful result encompasses many ideas and is 
broadly applicable to any second-best analysis, not just this specific category. It helps to 
account for a variety of specific results in the literature on research benefits in a distorted 
market setting (e.g., Murphy et al. 1993, Chambers & Lopez 1993). For instance, immi­
serizing technological change requires that the effect of research be to worsen the con­
sequences of an existing distortion sufficiently to more than outweigh the maximum 
potential benefits, which is a rather extreme outcome. 
2.3. Political Economy Models 
Models of agricultural research in a distorted market setting have been used to draw 
inferences about implications of market distortions for the rate of investment in agricul­
tural research and thus the rate and direction of technological change (e.g., Hayami & 
Ruttan 1971, Schultz 1978, Mellor & Johnston 1984). Further wrinkles are added if we 
treat the distortions as endogenous, being determined jointly with the research investment 
and thus the technological change in a political economy or interest group model: 
Studies in this vein include, among others, Rausser (1982), Gardner (1988), de Gorter & 
Zilberman (1990), Rausser & Foster (1990), de Gorter et al. (1992), Alston & Pardey 
(1993), Foster & Rausser (1993), and de Gorter & Swinnen (1998, 2002). For instance, de 
Gorter & Zilberman (1990) used a model of industry technology with inelastic demand in 
which, consistent with the discussion in Section 2.1, farmers would lose from research in 
account for and justify farm support policies we can 
in the presence setting but would benefit from research an undistorted of a target price 
policy. Thus, they suggest as having 
been introduced to make possible socially beneficial research that otherwise would not 
have been politically acceptable to agricultural interests. 
       
    
   
Political economy models that suppose agricultural research and farm program policies 
are chosen jointly to maximize a single criterion function typically involve two important 
abstractions from reality. First, the models assume a single government choosing combina­
tions of policies to maximize a single criterion function. However, in countries such as the 
United States, the policies are chosen by different governments. Farm program policies are 
determined federally, whereas public agricultural research investments are predominantly 
the province of state government agencies, albeit using funds from a mixture of sources 
including state governments and various arms of the federal government.10,11 Second, the 
models treat the consequences of today’s R&D policies as though they are felt immediately 
along with the effects of today’s farm commodity policies, but the impacts of today’s 
research are realized only after long lags, measured in decades. The research policies that 
are interacting with and determining the impacts of today’s commodity programs were 
implemented by the governments in power 20 years ago—the agricultural R&D policies 
established under George H.W. Bush, not George W. Bush, will determine the impact of 
farm program policies to be introduced by President Obama.12 
The extent to which the results from the models are conditioned by these abstrac­
tions remains a matter for conjecture. To be sure, research policies chosen by any of the 
50 state governments will be influenced by the present and prospective price policies to 
be implemented by the federal government, and the price policies introduced by the 
federal government in its periodic farm bills will have been influenced by the federal 
and state agricultural R&D programs over the previous decades. However, the relation­
ships are many dimensional and multiperiod, with recursive rather than simultaneous 
causation, and thus are unlikely to be represented accurately by a simple static trade-off 
of welfare among producers, consumers, and taxpayers to maximize a single objective 
function. 
3. RESEARCH THAT CREATES DATA ON RESEARCH 
INSTITUTIONS, INVESTMENTS, AND IMPACTS 
A significant part of the economic literature includes studies that describe, document, and 
quantify the institutions that fund, regulate, and conduct agricultural research as well as 
the investments that they make. These “descriptive” studies are of value in their own right, 
but they also provide an institutional frame of reference and data for econometric and 
other modeling studies. Although documenting the institutional-descriptive studies alone 
would take much more time than we can spend in this review, we mention a few key 
10Over the past several decades in particular, federal government departments and agencies other than agriculture, 
such as the National Science Foundation, National Institutes of Health, Department of Defense, and the Environ­
mental Protection Agency, account for a larger, and now sizable, share of the federal funds directed to public 
agricultural R&D in the United States. 
11de Gorter et al. (1992, p. 30) recognized the issue of multiple governments and asserted that “there is no reason to 
believe that disaggregating the decision process would refute [their] results.” Gordon Rausser has advised us in a 
personal communication that Rausser et al. (2009) formally demonstrate that, even when agricultural research is the 
result of policies chosen by different governments, a criterion function can be derived that is based on a weighting of 
consumer, producer, and taxpayer interests. 
12Given very long agricultural R&D lags, it does not seem reasonable to use a model that requires an implicit 
assumption that commodity program policies set in a given farm bill will be fixed for the period in which the R&D 
policies set in the same farm bill will have effect. For instance, consider the dramatic changes in farm program 
policies in 1985, 1996, and 2002 (e.g., see Alston & Sumner 2007). 
studies that documented institutions in the context of making broader contributions to the 
literature on the economics of research. Notable contributions to the literature on U.S. 
agricultural research policy that provided institutional history, documented data on invest­
ments, or both include Ruttan (1982), Huffman & Evenson (1993, 2006), Kerr (1987), 
and Alston & Pardey (1996, 2006). Studies taking an international perspective include 
Hayami & Ruttan (1971), Evenson & Kislev (1975), Baum (1986), Pardey et al. (1991, 
2006), Alston et al. (1999), and World Bank (2008). 
Work has also been undertaken to develop concepts and measures related to agricultur­
al science effort (in terms of public and private research investments, training and employ­
ment of research staff, and the like) and research output (in terms of new crop varieties 
and livestock breeds, patents, plant breeders rights, publications, and so on). In addition, 
substantial investments have been made in conceptual and empirical development of other 
measures (e.g., of prices and quantities of agricultural inputs and outputs) that are useful 
for measuring production relationships in agriculture, including research outcomes (e.g., 
the impacts on prices, production, consumption, and trade as well as the total benefit from 
research and its distribution). 
Studies of the relationship between research and productivity rely on the painstaking 
and demanding work of the economist who makes the data on inputs and outputs used in 
studies of production more generally. As noted by Griliches in his Presidential Address to 
the American Economic Association: 
We ourselves do not put enough emphasis on the value of data and data 
collection in our training of graduate students and in the reward structure of 
our profession. It is the preparation skill of the econometric chef that catches 
the professional eye, not the quality of the raw materials in the meal, or the 
effort that went into procuring them (Griliches 1994, p. 14). 
In his Waugh lecture to the American Agricultural Economics Association, Gardner 
discussed the importance of data creation and of having econometricians and other data 
users know how the data they use were created: 
Agricultural economists and other social scientists tend to take data as 
facts. . . The problem is the data are not facts. Facts are what is really 
there. Data are quantitative representation of facts, which statistical work­
ers and economists concoct (Gardner 1992, p. 1074). 
I call the study of how primary statistical information is made into economic 
data “factology.” The neglect of factology risks scientific ruin (Gardner 1992, 
p. 1067). 
Gardner drew specific attention to the measurement of agricultural inputs (especially 
capital), outputs, and productivity as instances where a lot of effort and judgment goes 
into the creation of the “data,” such that the data themselves are very much trans­
formed from the raw material used to make them, and consequently 
to agricultural R&D, when they involve 
point applies perhaps sameThemost. 
areas where factol­
ogy matters more than even more forcefully to 
studies of the returns significant further trans­
formation of data on research investments and productivity that already had embodied 
in them a great deal of judgment, much of which may not be apparent to the user. 
Unfortunately, the lessons from Gardner’s lecture have not been embraced by all 
      
   
practitioners, but some progress has been made with developing and documenting im­
proved measures of agricultural inputs, outputs, and productivity as well as agricultural 
research investments, which are the raw materials for many studies of returns to agricul­
tural R&D. 
Andersen (2005) reviewed previous studies of U.S. agricultural productivity patterns 
and documented the evolution of approaches and results.13 This literature shows an 
evolution from national fixed-weight indexes to state-level Divisia approximations using 
Fisher-ideal or Tornqvist-Theil indices, with increasing use of the appropriate index num­
ber theory (and other economic theory) combined with less aggregated data to reduce 
index number bias and other distortions in the measures. 
Two separate long-term endeavors, one led by Eldon Ball at the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA)-Economic Research Service and the other by Philip Pardey at the 
University of Minnesota, have produced alternative state-level data sets that entail substan­
tial differences in spite of essentially common purposes and similar basic information (for 
details and discussion, see Acquaye et al. 2000, 2003; Andersen 2005; Andersen et al. 2008; 
Alston et al. 2009). The data from Andersen et al. (2009) were developed specifically for 
measuring the economic consequences of U.S. public agricultural research, and the creation 
of these and the corresponding data on research investments has been by far the most 
demanding part of that long-standing project culminating in the book by Alston et al. 
(2009). 
Compared with measures of productivity and its elements, measures of investment in 
research (and counterpart measures of stocks of scientific knowledge) have attracted 
much less effort and attention in the literature. This relative neglect could be compara­
tively pernicious. It takes a lot of work to develop measures of agricultural research 
investments. Appropriate measures of public agricultural research investments are not 
published in suitably long time series, in the relevant form, by any government agency. 
However, some data have been compiled by Huffman & Evenson (1993), the National 
Science Foundation (2008), Robbins & Moylan (2007), and Pardey & Andersen (2009). 
Guidelines for compiling such data include work by the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (2002, 2005). For international data, see Pardey et al. 
(2006) and the Agricultural Science and Technology Indicators (ASTI) Web site at 
http://www.asti.cgiar.org/. 
To derive the relevant measures of public research spending requires delving through 
various government documents and sorting out those elements from particular spend­
ing lines that are truly research and truly applied to agriculture. It also requires going 
across places and backward through time, dealing with changing definitions, changing 
reporting procedures, and inevitable omissions. The long agricultural R&D lags mean 
13Barton & Cooper (1948), Loomis & Barton (1961), and Baron & Durost (1960) were among the first researchers 
to compile national indexes of inputs, outputs, and productivity in U.S. agriculture. These authors calculated fixed-
weight indexes, where the weights were equal to the average price of each subaggregate over a few selected years 
(see also Griliches 1960). The USDA published fixed-weight (Laspeyres) indexes of inputs, outputs, and productivity 
annually in Changes in Farm Production and Efficiency until the early 1990s. Griliches & Jorgenson (1966, 1967) 
of the general economy. were among the first to apply Divisia aggregation procedures to productivity measures 

According to Capalbo & Vo (1988, p. 101), Brown (1978) was the first researcher to compile Divisia indexes of 

inputs and outputs in U.S. agriculture. More recent studies of U.S. agricultural productivity include Ball (1985), 

Evenson et al. (1987), Capalbo & Vo (1988), Craig & Pardey (1990a,b; 2001), Jorgenson & Gollop (1992), 

Huffman & Evenson (1992, 1993), Ball (1994), Pardey et al. (1994), Ahearn et al. (1998), Ball et al. (1997), Ball & 

Nehring (1998), Ball et al. (1999), Acquaye et al. (2000, 2003), and Alston et al. (2009). 

        
        
that time-series econometric studies require many years of data on both investments in 
R&D and productivity. Many studies have been constrained by the lack of suitably 
long time series, and researchers have resorted to estimation devices that almost surely 
have distorted the findings—such as imposing restrictions on the lag distribution length 
and shape or creating estimates of past data using crude extrapolations from the 
present, a data step that is not always apparent to the reader of the distilled research 
product. Data on private research investments have been particularly difficult to ob­
tain, even in relatively short time series, because the information is proprietary—and 
even public companies are not obliged to publish the relevant information in their 
annual reports in a way that would be useful to economics researchers: For compila­
tions of U.S. private sector agricultural R&D data, see Huffman & Evenson (1993), 
Klotz et al. (1995), Fuglie et al. (1996), Echeverrıa & Byerlee (2002), and Dehmer´ 
et al. (2009). 
4. ATTRIBUTION PROBLEMS IN MODELS OF RESEARCH IMPACTS 
In modeling the effects of research on agricultural productivity the two principal areas of 
difficulty are in identifying the research lag structure (the temporal attribution problem) 
and in the treatment of knowledge spillovers whether they are among different firms 
within an industry, different industries within a country or other geopolitical entity, or 
among countries (the spatial and institutional-cum-sectoral attribution problem). 
4.1. Temporal Aspects of the R&D Attribution Problem 
Research takes a long time to affect production, and then it affects production for a long 
time. Once formed, innovations and knowledge take time to be diffused and affect 
productivity, and so the overall lag between R&D spending and productivity growth 
reflects a confluence between the lags involved in knowledge creation and in its 
subsequent use. One element of the attribution problem, then, is in identifying the 
specifics of the dynamic structure linking research spending, knowledge stocks, and 
productivity. 
A large number of previous studies have regressed a measure of agricultural production 
or productivity against variables representing agricultural research and extension, often 
with a view to estimating the rate of return to research. Alston et al. (2000) provided a 
comprehensive reporting and evaluation of this literature (see also Schuh & Tollini 1979, 
Norton & Davis 1981, Evenson 2001, Alston et al. 2009). 
Only a few studies have presented much in the way of formal theoretical justifica­
tion for the particular lag models they have employed in modeling returns to agricul­
tural research. Alston et al. (1995) presented a conceptual framework based on a view 
that agricultural production uses service flows from a stock of knowledge (e.g., see 
Rausser 1974), which is augmented by research (e.g., see Griliches 1979).14 The specifi­
cation of the determinants research investments andof the lag relationship between 
The fact that science is a cumulative process, in which today’s new ideas are derived from the accumulated stock 14
of past ideas, influences the nature of the research-productivity relationship as well. This makes the creation of 
knowledge unlike other production processes. 
  
        
   
production, which involves the dynamics of knowledge creation, depreciation, and utiliza­
tion, is crucial. A finite lag distribution relates past investments in research to current 
increments to the stock of knowledge. However, even if knowledge depreciates in some 
fashion over time, under reasonable views of the nature, rate, and form of depreciation of 
knowledge, some effects of research will persist forever. As a practical matter, analysts end 
up representing these effects with a finite distributed lag that represents the confounded 
effects of the lags in the knowledge creation process and the dynamics of depreciation of 
the knowledge stock. In such a context, it is difficult to have precise views about the 
nature of the reduced-form empirical lag relationship between research investments and 
productivity, in terms of its overall length and shape, apart perhaps from a perception that 
there will be an initial “gestation” or “invention” lag (before research has any effects), an 
“adoption” lag during which the lag weights rise to a maximum, and, eventually, declining 
weights as the impact of past research investments on current productivity fades into 
unimportance. 
Table 2 summarizes some key features of research lag distribution models applied in 
studies of agricultural productivity in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel­
opment countries. This table represents a reworked version of table 5 in Alston et al. 
(2000). Until quite recently, it was common to restrict the lag length to be less than 
20 years. In the earliest studies, available time series were short and lag lengths were very 
short, but the more recent studies have tended to use longer lags. Most studies have 
restricted the lag distribution to be represented by a small number of parameters, both 
because the time span of the data set is usually not much longer than the assumed 
maximum lag length and because the individual lag parameter estimates are unstable and 
imprecise given the high degree of collinearity between multiple series of lagged research 
expenditures.15 
In their application using long-run, state-level data on U.S. agriculture, Alston et al. 
(2009) found in favor of a gamma lag distribution model with a much longer research lag 
than most previous studies had found—for both theoretical and empirical reasons.16 Their 
empirical work supported a research lag of at least 35 years and up to 50 years for U.S. 
agricultural research, with a peak lag in year 24. Alston et al. (2008) also documented the 
adoption lags for particular agricultural technologies and their results are consistent with 
relatively long overall lags. This comparatively long lag has implications for both econo­
metric estimates of the effects of research on productivity and the implied rate of return to 
research. 
4.2. Spatial Aspects of the R&D Attribution Problem 
Compared with the research lag structure, the issue of spatial attribution has received less 
attention in the literature on agricultural R&D and has been approached differently in the 
15Common types of lag structures used to construct a research stock include the de Leeuw or inverted-V (e.g., 
Evenson 1967), polynomial (e.g., Davis 1980, Leiby & Adams 2002, Thirtle & Bottomley 1988), and trapezoidal 
(e.g., Huffman & Evenson 1989, 1992, 1993, 2006; Evenson 1996). A small number of studies have used free-form 
lags (e.g., Ravenscraft & Scherer 1982, Pardey & Craig 1989, Chavas & Cox 1992). 
16The detailed arguments are laid out in Alston et al. (1995) and some earlier evidence is presented by Pardey & 
Craig (1989) and Alston et al. (1998) (see also Huffman & Evenson 1989). Alston et al. (1998) discussed the issue 
of knowledge depreciation drawing on the previous literature, and these arguments are restated and refined by 
Alston et al. (2008), and Alston et al. (2009). 
         
 
 
  
      
  
 
 
  
Table 2 Research lag structures in studies of agricultural productivitya 
Characteristic 
Number of 
estimates 1958–1969 1970–1979 1980–1989 1990–1998 1958–1998 
Count Percentage 
Research lag length (benefits) 
0–10 years 253 9.7 6.2 17.9 12.7 13.4 
11–20 years 537 41.9 22.0 38.8 22.8 28.5 
21–30 years 376 0.0 20.7 12.0 25.9 19.9 
31–40 years 178 0.0 4.3 5.6 14.3 9.4 
40 up to 1 years 141 0.0 9.5 6.6 7.6 7.5 
1 years 102 35.5 7.5 2.9 5.4 5.4 
Unspecifiedb 109 12.9 13.1 3.2 4.9 5.8 
Unclearc 190 0.0 16.7 12.7 6.3 10.1 
Total 1,886 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
aBased on the full sample of 292 publications reporting 1886 observations. Adapted from Alston et al. (2000). 

bUnspecified estimates are those for which the research lag length is not made explicit. 

cLag length is unclear. 

literature on industrial R&D. In the more-recent literature, however, increasing attention 
has been paid to accounting for the fact that knowledge created within a particular 
geopolitical entity can have impacts on technology elsewhere, with implications that may 
matter to both the creators of the spillouts and the recipients of the spillins (for a review of 
this literature, see Alston 2002). 
Some of the earliest work on these matters was done in applications to agriculture. The 
analysis by Griliches (1957) of the generation and dissemination of hybrid-corn technolo­
gy throughout the United States was a seminal study in the economics of diffusion as well 
as the spatial spillover of an agricultural technology. This work inspired others on adop­
tion of individual technologies, some of which entailed spatial spillovers. For example, 
Evenson & Kislev (1973) analyzed spillovers related to wheat and maize research, Araji 
et al. (1995) looked at spillovers regarding potato research, and Maredia et al. (1996) and 
Traxler & Byerlee (2001) investigated wheat spillovers. Pardey et al. (1996) analyzed the 
U.S. effects of rice and wheat varieties developed by international research centers in the 
Philippines and Mexico, and Pardey et al. (2006) assessed international and institutional 
crop varietal spillovers into Brazil. 
Other studies have sought to assess the overall effects of agricultural research on 
productivity, including spillover impacts, with regression-based methods using more ag­
gregate (region­ or state-specific as well as national) measures of R&D. For example 
Huffman & Evenson (1993) found that a sizable share (upwards of 45%) of the benefits 
from research conducted in U.S. State Agricultural Experiment Stations was earned as 
interstate spillovers. 
      
   
 
Whether they were concerned with spillovers or not, the past studies have imposed 
implicit or explicit assumptions about the spatial spillover effects of agricultural research 
based on geopolitical boundaries. For example, most past studies of the effects of U.S. 
agricultural research on productivity have implicitly assumed that agricultural research 
is totally fungible, such that U.S. national agricultural output depends on the national 
aggregate of U.S. spending on public agricultural R&D, regardless of where it was spent 
or by whom (e.g., Griliches 1964, Evenson 1967, White & Havlicek 1982, Chavas & 
Cox 1992, Alston et al. 1998). In contrast, some studies at the level of individual states 
proposed that research efforts by individual states have spillover effects only among 
states within the same (subnational) geopolitical region, whereas research outside a 
region does not affect its agricultural productivity (e.g., Khanna et al. 1994, Yee & 
Huffman 2001).17 Several other studies, beginning with Huffman & Evenson (1989), 
incorporated geoclimatic information while retaining the restriction that technology 
spillovers occur only among neighboring states within contiguous geopolitical regions. 
Huffman & Evenson (1992, 1993, 2001, 2006), Huffman & Just (1994, 1999), and 
McCunn & Huffman (2000) subsequently used the same set of constructed spillover 
weights. 
Many studies, however, simply ignored the effects of research in other states or by the 
federal government, and almost all of the regression-based studies of agricultural R&D 
have ignored the possibility of international spillovers, unless they were specifically 
emphasizing that possibility.18 Looking more broadly at the literature, few studies of 
national systems, irrespective of the method used, have allowed for either spillins or 
spillouts—in their meta-analysis, Alston et al. (2000) identified less than 20% of studies 
allowing for any spillovers. 
The modeling decisions—either to ignore spillovers or to represent them using mea­
sures based on physical proximity—have been at least to some extent driven by the 
limitations of available data and the requirements for parsimonious models. Even when 
we are conscious of the possibility of interstate or international spillover effects (and not 
totally hamstrung by data limitations), it is not clear what we ought to do about them. 
Clearly, however, restrictive assumptions are inevitable. 
5. EVIDENCE ON THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES 
OF AGRICULTURAL R&D 
Alston et al. (2000) conducted a meta-analysis of 292 studies that reported estimates of 
returns to agricultural R&D, and they reported an overall mean internal rate of return 
for their sample of 1852 estimates of 81.3% with a mode of 40% and a median of 
44.3% (see Table 3). After dropping some outliers and incomplete observations, they 
conducted regression analysis using a sample of 1128 estimates with a mean of 64.6%, a 
17Citation patterns in the patent applications and in professional published literature indicate that spatial spillovers 
are much more pervasive. 
18Bouchet et al. (1989) is an exception. In addition, studies of the effects of the CGIAR centers on agricultural 
productivity in adopting countries using other than regression methods have emphasized the spillins of technology 
(e.g., Brennan & Fox 1995, Pardey et al. 1996, Brennan et al. 1997, Brennan & Bantilan 1999, Brennan 2007). 
Alston (2002) reviewed these studies. Brennan (2007) reported a more-recent application to wheat spillovers from 
CIMMYT to Australia. 
          
 
 
    
 
  
      
  
   
 
 
   
 
Table 3 Lag structures and rates of return to agricultural R&Da 
Characteristic 
Estimates Rate of return 
Number 
Share of 
total Mean Mode Median Minimum Maximum 
Count Percentage 
Research lag length 
0–10 370 20.9 90.7 58.0 56.0 56.6 1,219.0 
11–20 490 27.7 58.5 49.0 43.7 100.0 677.0 
21–30 358 20.2 152.4 57.0 53.9 0.0 5,645.0 
31–40 152 8.6 64.0 40.0 41.1 0.0 384.4 
40 to 1 years 113 6.4 29.3 20.0 19.0 0.3 301.0 
1 years 57 3.2 49.9 20.0 35.0 14.9 260.0 
Unspecified 205 11.6 48.7 25.0 34.5 1.1 337.0 
Unclear 27 1.5 43.1 27 and 60 38.0 9.0 125.0 
Research gestation lag 
Included 468 59.2 65.5 46.0 47.1 14.9 526.0 
Omitted 314 39.7 96.7 95.0 58.8 0.0 1,219.0 
Unspecified or 
unclear 
8 1.0 25.1 24.1 6.9 55.0 
Total 790 100.0 77.5 46 and 58 50.2 14.9 1,219.0 
Spillovers 
Spillins 291 16.7 94.5 95.0 68.0 0.0 729.7 
Spillouts 70 4.0 73.7 95.0 46.4 8.9 384.4 
No spillovers 1,428 81.7 78.8 49 and 57 40.0 100.0 5,645.0 
aBased on a full sample of 292 publications reporting 1886 observations. For all characteristics, the sample excludes two extreme outliers and 
includes returns to research only and combines research and extension so that the maximum sample size is 1772. For the research gestation lag, 
the sample includes only observations with an explicit lag shape, resulting in a sample size of 790 observations. For spillovers, 25 observations 
were lost owing to incomplete information, resulting in a sample size of 1747 observations. Some estimates have spillover effects in both 
directions. Based on data reported in Alston et al. (2000). 
mode of 28%, and a median of 42.0%. They found results that were generally consistent 
with expectations, but in many cases they could not distinguish statistically significant 
effects on the estimated rates of return associated with the nature of the research being 
evaluated, the industry to which it applied, or the evaluation methodology, because the 
signal-to-noise ratio was too low. Nevertheless, a predominant and persistent finding 
across the studies was that the rate of return was quite large. The main mass of the 
distribution of internal rates of return reported in the literature is between 20% and 80% 
per annum. 
       
  
   
Alston et al. (2000) concluded that the evidence suggests that agricultural R&D has 
paid off handsomely for society, but they raised a number of concerns about the 
methods used in the  studies that were likely to have led  to  upwards biases in the  
estimates. In particular, they suggested the studies may have suffered from bias asso­
ciated with (a) using research lag distributions that were too short (the results showed 
that increasing the research lag length resulted in smaller rates of return, as theory 
would predict); (b) “cherry picking” bias in which only the most successful research 
investments were evaluated; (c) attribution biases associated with failing to account 
for the spillover roles of other private and public research agencies, in other states or 
other countries, in contributing to the measured benefits; or (d) other aspects of the 
methods used. 
5.1. Recent Evidence on U.S. Agricultural R&D 
More recently, Alston et al. (2009) modeled state-specific U.S. agricultural productivity 
for the period 1949–2002 as a function of public agricultural research and extension 
investments over 1890–2002. In this study, careful attention was paid to the types of 
methodological issues raised by Alston et al. (2000) and emphasized in this section, in 
particular to modeling the research lag distribution and the state-to-state spillovers of 
research impacts. Spillovers (or agroecological similarity or technological closeness) 
between states were represented using a measure based on output mix correlations— 
an adaptation of the approach of Jaffe (1986, 1989) who constructed a measure of 
technological distance between firms based on patent data. The research lag distribu­
tion was estimated using a flexible gamma distribution model. The results supported 
relatively long research lags (an overall lag length of 50 years with a peak impact at 
24 years but with most of the impact exhausted within 40 years), with a very 
substantial share of a state’s productivity growth attributable to research conducted 
by other states and the federal government. These results mean that the national 
benefits from a state’s research investment substantially exceed the own-state benefits, 
adding to the sources of market failure in agricultural R&D because state govern­
ments may be expected to ignore or at least (heavily) discount the spillover benefits to 
other states. 
Table 4 summarizes the results from the authors’ preferred model, showing the 
distribution of own-state and national benefits from state-specific and federal invest­
ments in agricultural research and extension in the United States, expressed in terms of 
benefit-cost ratios and internal rates of return.19 The results show that marginal incre­
ments in investments in agricultural research and extension (R&E) by the 48 contiguous 
U.S. states generated own-state benefits of between $2 and $58 per research dollar, 
averaging $21 across the states (the lower benefit-cost ratios were generally for the states 
with smaller and shrinking agricultural sectors, especially in New England). Allowing for 
the spillover benefits into other states, state-specific agricultural research 
generated national benefits of between $10 and $70 per research dollar, 
19There are compelling reasons to report benefit-cost ratios rather than internal rates of return in this instance, as 
discussed by Alston et al. (2009). Some internal rates of return are reported here to facilitate comparisons with other 
studies. 
investments 
averaging 
            
 
  
  
        
    
        
  
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
Table 4 Benefit-cost ratios and internal rates of return for U.S. agricultural R&Da 
Returns to 
(3% 
Benefit-cost ratio 
real discount rate) Internal rate of return 
Own-state National Own-state National 
State research and extension Ratio Percent per year 
48 states 
Average 21.0 32.1 18.9 22.7 
Minimum 2.4 9.9 7.4 15.3 
Maximum 57.8 69.2 27.6 29.1 
Selected states 
California 33.3 43.4 24.1 26.1 
Minnesota 40.6 55.4 24.7 27.3 
Wyoming 12.7 23.6 16.8 20.9 
Regions 
Pacific 21.8 32.9 20.2 23.5 
Mountain 20.0 31.6 19.0 22.7 
Northern Plains 42.4 54.5 24.9 27.0 
Southern Plains 20.2 31.0 19.5 22.7 
Central 33.7 46.8 23.1 25.9 
Southeast 15.1 26.7 17.6 22.0 
Northeast 9.4 18.4 14.0 19.0 
USDA Research 17.5 18.7 
aSource: Alston et al. (2009). 
$32 across the states. The marginal benefit-cost ratio for USDA intramural research was 
comparable, at $18 per dollar invested in research. 
The benefit-cost ratios in Table 4 are generally large and might seem implausibly large 
to some readers. In fact, however, these ratios are consistent with internal rates of return at 
the smaller end of the range compared with the general results in the literature as reviewed 
by Alston et al. (2000) and summarized in Table 3, and as discussed by others (e.g., 
Evenson 2001, Fuglie & Heisey 2007). Specifically, the estimates of own-state “private” 
rates of return ranged from 7.4% to 27.6%, with an average of 18.9% per annum across 
the states, the estimates of national “social” rates of return ranged from 15.3% to 29.1%, 
with an average of 22.9% per annum across the states, and the rate of return to USDA 
intramural research was 18.7% per annum. 
  
   
6. CONCLUSION 
The literature on the economics of agricultural R&D is large. In this review, we have 
concentrated on some key areas where results may be fragile or distorted as a result of 
modeling choices made by economists. The creation of the “data” used in our analyses is a 
critical step. Because the interpretation of results often depends crucially on the data, it is 
incumbent on the data user to invest at least as far as knowing how the data were made, 
but there is no mechanism for enforcing this investment and it does not appear to have 
been a focus of effort. Like the work of creating data, factology is not well rewarded 
within the agricultural economics profession. Even so, the available data have significantly 
improved as a result of the efforts of a few individuals. 
Along with the data, models used for measuring research benefits have improved over 
the years. Analysis has revealed some areas where findings are sensitive to modeling 
choices, including the representation of technological change in the model, the treatment 
of spillovers, and the R&D lag distribution. These are essentially empirical questions that 
are often difficult to resolve with the available data but must be settled, and they can have 
substantial impacts on the findings. The issue of how to go about specifying the research-
induced technical change is largely unresolved. Better progress has been made with lags 
and spillovers. The trend has been to find larger spillover impacts and longer research lags 
in studies that test for these aspects. Models that inappropriately ignore spillovers or 
truncate the lag are likely to find higher rates of return to research as a result. Other 
specification choices—such as how to deal with market distortions from market power of 
firms, government policy, or environmental externalities—have relatively important 
effects on estimates of the distribution of benefits and relatively little effect on estimates 
of the total benefits. 
Agricultural economists have invested extensively in quantifying the payoffs to agricul­
tural R&D, but for the most part, these studies have referred to total benefits to the 
relevant society, rather than to particular groups in society. Partly, this may reflect the fact 
that findings regarding distributional impacts are comparatively sensitive to aspects of 
specification that often must be chosen arbitrarily; thus the results are fragile. An example 
is Cochrane’s technology treadmill argument suggesting that, among farmers, only the 
early adopters of new technology benefit, and even they do so only temporarily (Cochrane 
1958, Herdt & Cochrane 1966). As shown in this review, specific conditions must hold for 
this argument to be true (it requires a relatively inelastic demand and a multiplicative 
supply shift), and they probably do not hold in most applications.20 But what we do not 
have is compelling, direct econometric evidence to show that farmers have in fact bene­
fited from technological change. It says something about our models and measures that we 
have not yet been able to address this issue definitively. 
As a profession, we have amassed a persuasive body of evidence demonstrating that the 
world as a whole and individual nations alone have benefited enormously from productiv­
ity growth in agriculture, a substantial amount of which has been enabled by technological 
20Even considering agriculture in aggregate in the United States, the relevant demand is likely to be quite elastic (see 
Alston 2007), which is sufficient for farmers to benefit, even if research causes a multiplicative supply shift, for 
which there is no evidence . For any individual agricultural industry for any individual country, demand is likely to 
be highly elastic because of international trade. The relevant demand is likely to be highly inelastic in a case where 
the analysis applies to relative aggregated commodities in the world as a whole—e.g., global producer benefits from 
increases in the supply of wheat—or highly localized markets in a developing country where lack of adequate 
infrastructure circumscribes the market reach of agricultural producers. 
  
  
change resulting from public and private investments in agricultural R&D. The evidence 
suggests that the benefits have been worth many times more than the costs. This is so, even 
if we discount the estimates heavily because we suspect they may have been upwardly 
biased, perhaps inadvertently through unfortunate choices of methods or limitations in the 
available data of the types discussed in this review. An implication is that the substantial 
government intervention notwithstanding, the world is continuing to underinvest in agri­
cultural R&D. 
SUMMARY POINTS 
1. The 	 total	 gross annual research benefits depend primarily on the size of the 
research-induced supply shift and the scale of the industry to which it applies. 
2. The distribution 	 of the benefits between producers and consumers depends on 
the relative elasticities of supply and demand, on the nature of the research-
induced supply shift, and, less importantly, on the functional forms of supply 
and demand. 
3. The very specification 	 of technology defined at the industry level or the use of 
a representative firm model will condition distributional results. If simple mod­
els (such as the Cobb-Douglas model or the Constant Elasticity of Substitution 
model) are used to represent the production function, then factor-augmenting 
technological change—whether neutral across all factors or biased to augment 
just one factor—or the inclusion of research as a separate input will imply 
proportional (pivotal or otherwise divergent) supply curve shifts. 
4. The possibility of losses to producers in aggregate as a consequence of research-
induced technical change is often discounted, on the grounds either that demand 
is relatively elastic or that a parallel research-induced supply shift is relatively 
likely (or that the pivotal shift seems comparatively unlikely), but concrete em­
pirical evidence on that issue has been elusive to date. 
5. Models of research benefits have been extended to incorporate various types of 
market distortions, such as farm commodity programs or trade barriers, the 
exercise of market power by middlemen, and those resulting from environmental 
externalities. The main effect of a market distortion in this context is to change 
the distribution of research benefits, with comparatively small effects on the total 
benefits. 
6. A significant part of the economic literature includes studies that describe, docu­
ment, and quantify the institutions that fund, regulate, and conduct agricultural 
research as well as the investments that they make. These “descriptive” studies 
are of value in their own right but they also provide an institutional frame of 
reference and data for econometric and other modeling studies. 
7. In modeling the effects of research on agricultural productivity, the two principal 
areas of difficulty are in identifying the research lag structure (the temporal 
attribution problem) and in the treatment of knowledge spillovers whether they 
are among different firms within an industry, among different industries within a 
  
 
      
      
    
  
     
    
     
     
      
     
       
         
   
    
                  
          
    
   
country or other geopolitical entity, or among countries (the spatial and institu­
tional-cum-sectoral attribution problem). 
8. A predominant and persistent finding across the economic returns-to-research 
studies is that the measured rate of return is quite large. The main mass of the 
distribution of internal rates of return reported in the literature is between 20% 
and 80% per annum. 
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